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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-3001 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES STEPHENS, 
  Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
(D.C. Action No. 3-11-cr-00016-006) 
District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 12, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 17, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 James Stephens was convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance.  He appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support 
                                                
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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his conviction.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
I 
The conspiracy in this case involved a drug distribution scheme in which Jerome 
Potter sold cocaine to Herbert Ferguson, who then sold the cocaine in powder and base 
(or “crack”) form to Stephens and others.  At trial, Ferguson testified for the Government, 
explaining that Stephens “started to work, selling cocaine and crack for [Ferguson] on St. 
John” three months before the conspiracy was foiled.  App. 500.  Ferguson explained that 
he sold Stephens half-ounce quantities of cocaine and crack two to three times per week. 
During wiretapped phone calls, Ferguson and Stephens discussed Stephens selling 
drugs “for” Ferguson.  App. 425.  On the calls, Ferguson and Stephens made references 
to “fish,” “Z,” “candy,” “plate,” “rocks,” and “biscuits,” which Ferguson later explained 
were code words for the drugs.  App. 590-91, 600, 606.  The calls also referred to 
proceeds from the drug sales.  For example, one call involved a discussion about how 
Stephens “had a thousand made already” but still owed Ferguson $600.  App. 601. 
Other calls pertained to the status of the drug operation.  For example, in one call, 
Stephens told Ferguson that Larry’s Landing, the place where Stephens and Ferguson 
sold drugs, was closed, so sales were “dead.”  App. 596, 603-04.  In another, Stephens 
told Ferguson’s wife that Ferguson should not “waste time” traveling to Larry’s Landing 
because no one was buying.  App. 604.  During another call, Stephens informed Ferguson 
that individuals they thought were “working for the cops” were “coming inside Larry’s 
Landing” and warned Ferguson that “they can’t come in here.”  App. 603-04.  Ferguson 
3 
 
testified that he and Stephens did not “allow [the suspected informants] to come in [to 
Larry’s Landing] to sell anything.”  App. 604.     
The jury convicted Stephens of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The jury further found that the 
conspiracy involved twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base.1  Stephens was 
sentenced to concurrent terms of 180 and forty-eight months’ imprisonment and five 
years’ supervised release.  He now appeals. 
II2 
 To prove a conspiracy of the sort alleged here, the government must show “(1) a 
shared unity of purpose; (2) an intent to achieve a common illegal goal; and (3) an 
agreement to work toward that goal.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 
418, 425 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).  It must “proffer sufficient evidence from which a jury 
could have concluded that each drug transaction in which [the defendant] was involved 
was a step in achieving the conspiracy’s common goal of distributing [drugs] for profit.”  
                                                
1 Stephens was also convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and use of a communication facility to 
facilitate a drug crime in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), but he does not challenge these 
convictions.   
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the grant or 
denial of a judgment of acquittal, reviewing the record “in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 
(3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).   
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United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 A “simple buyer-seller relationship, without any prior or contemporaneous 
understanding beyond the sales agreement itself, is insufficient to establish that the buyer 
was a member of the seller’s conspiracy.”  Id.  However, “an occasional supplier,” and 
“an occasional buyer for redistribution[] can be shown to be a member of the conspiracy 
by evidence . . . of knowledge that she or he was part of a larger operation.”  Id. at 198 
(quotation marks and internal citations omitted).  As we said in Gibbs,  
where the defendant’s only involvement in the conspiracy appears to be 
drug purchases, courts have looked to the surrounding circumstances to 
determine whether [he] is a mere buyer who had such limited dealings with 
the conspiracy that he cannot be held to be a conspirator, or whether he has 
knowledge of the conspiracy to the extent that his drug purchases are 
circumstantial evidence of his intent to join that conspiracy. 
   
Id. at 199.  In doing so, we consider a non-exhaustive list of factors, including “the length 
of affiliation between the defendant and the conspiracy; whether there is an established 
method of payment; the extent to which transactions are standardized; and whether there 
is a demonstrated level of mutual trust.”  Id.  Mutual trust may be shown by transactions 
involving large amounts of drugs and the extension of credit.  Id. at 199-200.  The 
presence of “one or more” factors furthers the inference “that [the] defendant has full 
knowledge of, if not a stake in, a conspiracy.”  Id.  In other words, “when a defendant 
drug buyer has repeated, familiar dealings with members of a conspiracy, that buyer 
probably comprehends fully the nature of the group with whom he is dealing, is more 
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likely to depend heavily on the conspiracy as the sole source of his drugs, and is more 
likely to perform drug-related acts for conspiracy members in an effort to maintain his 
connection to them.”  Id. at 199.   
 Application of the Gibbs factors demonstrates that Stephens was a member of the 
conspiracy.  First, Ferguson testified that Stephens had been selling drugs “for” Ferguson 
for three months, App. 425, and the recorded calls between Ferguson and Stephens reveal 
coded conversations detailing numerous transactions in which drugs flowed from 
Ferguson to Stephens and then from Stephens to his customers.3  Thus, this is not a case 
“in which the evidence showed only a single or a very limited number of sales for 
personal use.”  United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 484 (1st Cir. 1993).  Second, 
evidence of trust was apparent from Stephens’s purchase of drugs on credit.  Third, the 
evidence showed that Stephens and Ferguson had a “mutual stake” in the transactions, as 
demonstrated by Stephens’s acting as a lookout for Ferguson.  Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199-
200.  Specifically, Stephens told Ferguson not to “waste time” coming to Larry’s Landing 
                                                
3 Ferguson’s recorded statements were properly admitted as coconspirator 
statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), as there was sufficient evidence to 
corroborate the existence of a conspiracy beyond the recorded statements themselves, 
United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2013), including Ferguson’s 
testimony that Stephens sold drugs “for” him at Larry’s Landing and made purchases of 
cocaine powder and cocaine base two or three times per week, App. 425.  See United 
States v. Mitchell, 596 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2010) (relying on cooperating witness’s in-
court testimony to corroborate that witness’s out-of-court statements to establish 
existence of a conspiracy under 801(d)(2)(E)); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 
659-60 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying on patient’s testimony to corroborate doctor’s out-of-court 
statements to establish existence of a conspiracy under 801(d)(2)(E)).  Ferguson’s 
statements were also corroborated by admissions Stephens made during the recorded 
conversations. 
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when drugs sales were slow and warned him when suspected informants attempted to sell 
drugs on their turf.  App. 604.  Moreover, Stephens acted to further the conspiracy by 
preventing the suspected informants from entering Larry’s Landing to sell drugs.  
Drawing all inferences in favor of the Government, this evidence shows that Stephens 
had a stake in the cocaine distribution scheme beyond that of a mere buyer and was 
therefore a member of the conspiracy.  
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
